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Abstract 
The “Two-Minute Portfolio” was first introduced by Rob Carrick in 1999 for the Globe 
and Mail’s Finance Section.  By using his strategy with equal weighting in each market 
sector, Rob claims that individual conservative long-term investors would spend little 
time in the portfolio selection and still outperform the market (TSX).  Over time, the 
“Two-Minute Portfolio” evolves its strategy to improve the performance.  Based on the 
four main characteristics of the Two-Minute Portfolio: Equal-weight strategy, Large-Cap 
(blue-chip) companies, Dividend-paying constraint, and Annual rebalancing schedule, we 
construct the Two-Minute Portfolios in both TSX and S&P 500 markets.  We tested the 
“Two-Minute Portfolio” strategy for its long-term mean return and risk-adjusted return.  
We found that the Two-Minute Portfolios do not provide statistically significant excess 
returns.  However, in terms of the risk-adjusted measurement, Two-Minutes Portfolios 
may perform better than benchmarks.  We further found that the added Dividend-Paying 
constraint does not provide significant improvement to the portfolio. 
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Introduction 
In 1999, Rob Carrick, the Globe and Mail’s Personal Finance Columnist, dredged up an 
idea called the “Two-Minute Portfolio”.  Carrick (1999) constructed two portfolios from 
December 31, 1998 by investing equal amount in the largest one or two blue-chip stocks 
in each of the S&P/TSX’s sub sectors.  Based on his test, both portfolios outperformed 
the TSX index.  He claimed such strategy improves diversification, lower the risk, creates 
investment discipline, and removes investors’ subjectivity.  Throughout the years, the 
strategy has been updated as well.  The latest “Two-Minute Portfolio” (Carrick, 2007) 
tracks the more diversified version by choosing two largest market-capitalized stocks in 
each TSX sectors, and a dividend-paying constraint is also added.  The portfolio needs to 
be rebalanced back to equal weight at the beginning of each year.  According to Carrick 
(2013), the Two-Minute Portfolio data was processed by Morningstar Canada senior 
consultant Craig McGee, who reported an annualized total return of 10.30% by back-
testing the portfolio to the beginning of 1986, compared to 8.20% for the TSX index.  
The portfolio was also claimed to be less risky with a beta of 0.71 compared to the 
market beta of 1.   
We find the Two-Minute Portfolio intriguing and conclude four main 
characteristics: Equal-weight strategy, Large-Cap (blue-chip) companies, Dividend-
paying constraint, and Annual rebalancing schedule.  If such strategy outperforms the 
market consistently, the finding is important for long-term conservative retail investors 
since it is easy to implement and does not require very high technical background, and it 
is less expensive than investing in active management portfolios.  This strategy can also 
be important for academics if this passive strategy could consistently outperform the 
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market, as the market efficiency theory would suggest the opposite.  The combination of 
Equal-weight strategy and anomalies such as size, dividend yield, and momentum effect 
may explain such outperformance. 
Based on these characteristics of the Two-Minute Portfolio, we review literatures 
around topics of portfolio performance measurement, sector allocation and equal-weight 
strategy, and anomalies such as size effect, dividend yields effect, and momentum effect 
in our paper.  In order to test the Two-Minute Portfolios, we use the latest published 
strategy (Carrick, 2007) and test it on both Canadian and U.S. equity markets, TSX and 
S&P 500.  Besides comparing the mean returns with the benchmarks, we also test the 
performances on the risk-adjusted base.  Furthermore, we are interested in how the 
dividend-paying constraint added in 2007 would affect the portfolio performance.  We 
test the relationship between the aggregate dividend yields and portfolio returns. 
 
Literature Review 
1. Portfolio Performance Measurement 
Traditional portfolio performance evaluation such as annual return (or mean return) is 
widely accepted by investors and practitioner literatures (for example, Morningstar, 
2004).  Marcus (1990) exams the performance of a star fund Fidelity Magellan mutual 
fund for its outperformance against S&P 500 index in 11 of 13 years from 1977 to 1989. 
As investors become more aware of the risk taking in their investments, risk-
adjusted performance measurements are developed.  Treynor (1965) suggests the reward-
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to-volatility ratio to evaluate a portfolio’s excess return over the risk-free rate to the 
systematic risk, which could be estimated by regressing the portfolio return to the 
benchmark.  Sharpe (1966) introduces the reward-to-variability ratio.  It measures the 
excess return adjusted for the degree of total risk in the portfolio or trading strategy.  
Jensen (1968) develops a method to exam a security’s abnormal return over the 
theoretical expected return, and to determine whether the deviation is statistically 
significant.  The method is used to exam whether it is managers’ ability or luck that 
attributes to the excess return.  Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) propose M-squared or 
RAP.  It measures a portfolio’s risk-adjusted return that is adjusted for the portfolio’s risk 
relative to the benchmark.  Unlike Sharpe Ratio, RAP can be easily understood by a lay 
investor as the measurement is in percentage, especially when there is a negative excess 
return. 
Although the above traditional risky-adjusted performance measures are widely 
accepted and used, investors should use them with care.  Sharpe (1966) studies the 
performance of 34 equity style mutual funds from 1954 to 1963.  He computes the Sharpe 
Ratios, and finds 19 of the 34 funds beat the Dow Jones.  However, after adding the 
management fees and expenses, only 11 funds beat the benchmark.  Jensen (1968) 
studied the alpha in 115 mutual funds.  He also concludes that the investment ability of 
fund managers is not great enough to recover even brokerage commissions.  Carlson 
(1970) studies the performance of common stocks, balanced, and income style mutual 
funds using Sharpe Ratio and Jesnen’s alpha.  He finds the Sharpe Ratio of the whole 
portfolio lower than S&P 500.  However, the Sharpe Ratio of common stock and 
balanced fund portfolio exceed the benchmark, while income fund’s Sharpe Ratio 
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underperforms.  He also finds the average net alpha is 0.6% per year, and the distribution 
of alpha across funds is positively skewed.  Carlson concludes that investors must take 
care in generalizing from the performance results of a specific mutual fund group and a 
specific market index.   
Above findings are important to us because transaction costs are not considered in 
our evaluation of the Two-Minute Portfolio.  Investors must take their brokerage 
commissions and other management expenses into account before making investment 
decisions. 
2. Sector Allocation and Equal-Weight Strategy 
Fama (1965) suggests that there is an efficient market for securities, and the market 
portfolio cannot be consistently outperformed.  The empirical test is conducted by Ferri et 
al. (1984).  They compare asset composition within a portfolio to that fund prior to 
periods of low stock prices.  They find mutual fund managers do not have consistent 
market timing abilities. 
Under the assumption that pricing errors are short-lived and the market prices will 
approach their fair value, Hsu (2006) argues that cap-weighted portfolios would assign 
more weight to overvalued stocks and less weight to undervalued stocks.  Thus, the cap-
weighted portfolios are not the optimal portfolios if the market is mildly inefficient.  
Chen et al. (2007) also argue that the cap-weighted portfolio is not mean-variance 
efficient under the same assumption. 
In 1998, State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) launched a set of nine ETFs, Select 
Sector SPDRs, which track the each S&P 500 sector returns.  In 2009, an equal-weight 
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strategy is adopted to create the ALPS Equal Sector Weight ETF (Ticker: EQL).  ALPS 
is an ETF of ETFs that invests in equal amount in each of the nine Select Sector SPDRs 
and rebalances quarterly.  According to their website (Select Sector SPDR ETFs, 2013), 
the Equal Sector Strategy has the benefits of “Diversification, Transparency and control 
over sector allocations, Consistent performance (outperformed the S&P 500 over 1, 3, 5, 
and 10 year periods), and Lower volatility than the S&P 500.” 
Sturm (2010) introduces the Sector Select ETFs.  He finds the Equal Sector 
strategy that weights equally in nine S&P 500 Select Sectors is the only one that 
significantly outperforms the market, comparing with other optimal risky portfolio 
strategies and a market portfolio.  However, transaction costs for monthly rebalancing the 
Equal Sector portfolio is omitted in his test.  The strategy would only make sense if the 
transaction cost is less than the average excess return.   
Conconi et al. (2013) study the Equal Sector strategy by testing the Sturm’s data 
period 2000-2007 and SSGA’s data period 2001-2010, and they further expand their data 
to a greater testing period 1989-2011.  They report the same outperformance during the 
same periods as reported by Sturm and SSGA.  However, the outperformance does not 
hold over the greater period.  They conclude the Equal Sector strategy does not have 
excess returns over long term, but may outperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis, 
especially during volatile market periods. 
Ferguson and Schofield (2010) test the equal-weight strategy by simulating an 
equal-weight portfolio on S&P 500 from January 1 1966 to June 30 2010.  They find the 
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equal-weight portfolio beat the capitalisation-weighted S&P 500 benchmark by an 
average of about three percent annually. 
Shimizu (2010) evaluates the equal-weight rebalancing strategy mathematically 
with all investment strategies with the following conditions: 
… (1) we have a certain number of assets for investment, (2) we 
limit the number of times that the portfolio can be rebalanced in the 
time horizon, (3) the weights of assets in the portfolio at the start and 
after each rebalancing are given as fractions that have a common 
denominator, (4) the portfolio does not have any short position or 
leveraged position, and (5) we can trade without frictions. (p. 28) 
However, Shimizu finds that the average performance of all investment strategies 
is equal to the performance of the equally-weight strategy under such conditions.   
Urbán and Ormos (2012) tested the equally-weight portfolios in both U.S. market 
S&P 500 and Hungarian market Budapest Stock Exchange.  They use Jensen’s alphas to 
measure positive abnormal returns.  They state that the excess returns found in the U.S. 
market cannot be observed in the Hungarian stock market using the same strategy. 
These findings are crucial since equal-weight strategy describe the main character 
of the Two-Minute Portfolio. 
3. Anomalies and Returns: Size, Dividend Yields, and Momentum Effect 
Schwert (2003) claims that as research leads to more efficient markets, anomalies such as 
data snooping, the size effect, the momentum effect, dividend yields and stock return, and 
etc. would disappear once they have been documented.  We are interested in the 
anomalies as they may affect the performance of the Two-Minute Portfolio. 
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Size Effect 
Both Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) test the small-capitalization firms on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  Based on the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) capital asset-
pricing model (CAPM) from 1936-75, they find the small-cap firms have higher average 
returns than expectations.  However, Schwert (2003) test the data from three subperiods, 
1982-1987, 1988-1993, and 1994-2002, and find small-firm anomaly has disappeared.  
Ferguson and Schoefield (2010) also claim that instead of the “small-firm” effect, the 
outperformance of the equal-weight portfolio is explained by capturing relative volatility.  
Urbán and Ormos (2012) also confirm that excess returns generated by equal-weight 
strategy are neither caused by the small-firm effect, nor by the book-to-market equity, nor 
even by persistence.   
This is important as the small-firm effect has often been considered in explaining 
the portfolio outperformance, while in our case, only large-cap (blue-chip) companies are 
selected in the Two-Minute Portfolio. 
Dividend Yields Effect 
Fama and French (1988) use CRSP data from 1927 to 1986.  They argue that aggregate 
dividend yields predict subsequent stock returns.  Schwert (2003) expands the data set to 
periods of 1872-1926, 1927-1986, and 1987-2000, and claims that the relation between 
aggregate dividend yields and subsequent stock returns is weakened both before and after 
the 1927-1986 period that studied by Fama and French.   
This is also interesting to us as dividend-paying is added to the Two-Minute 
Portfolio constraints, and it is claimed to bring outperformance. 
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Momentum Effect 
Debondt and Thaler (1985) suggest a contrarian anomaly whereby stocks with low 
returns in the past three to five years have higher average returns than stocks with high 
returns in the past three to five years.  Ferguson and Schoefield (2010) also suggest that 
the rebalancing schedule of the equal-weight portfolio has a “buy low/sell high” character 
and it generates outperformance.  On the contrary, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) claim a 
continuation or short-term momentum effect that portfolios formed on the last year with 
high returns out-perform portfolios formed on the last year with low returns.  
Furthermore, Schwert (2003) test the momentum effects based on Fama and French 
(1993) three factor model.  He claims that “[t]he evidence on the momentum effect seems 
to persist, but may reflect predictable variation in risk premiums that are not yet 
understood.”   
We find this nontrivial since the Two-Minute Portfolio has an annual rebalancing 
schedule, whereas Sturm (2010) and ALPS Equal Sector Weight ETF (Select Sector 
SPDR ETFs, 2013) have monthly and quarterly rebalancing schedules respectively. 
 
Methodology 
With the literature challenging whether the equal-weight strategy, the main character of 
the Two-Minute Portfolio, yields outperformance and relations between anomalies and 
portfolio returns, we would like to test the Two-Minute Portfolio in the following aspects: 
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1. Mean Return 
Hypothesis 1 
To confirm the Carrick’s claim that the long-term return of the Two-Minute Portfolio 
outperforms the benchmark, we perform a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that 
excess returns are equal to zero with 95% significance level: 
                
Hypothesis 2 
To find whether the Two-Minute Portfolio yields abnormal excess return, we also 
perform the second two-sided test of the null hypothesis that Jensen’s Alpha is equal to 
zero with 95% significance level: 
              
Procedure 
We use the holding period return formula to calculate the mean return with the 
consideration of dividends and price appreciation: 
   
  
    
                  (1) 
where    is the portfolio value at time  . 
 The expected periodic return is calculated as the arithmetic average of the 
historically observed mean returns: 
     
 
 
∑  
 
   
 (2) 
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where   is the number of time periods   within a year. 
 For the first hypothesis test, the excess return is calculated as the difference 
between the periodic portfolio return    and benchmark return   : 
          (3) 
 For the second hypothesis test, the excess abnormal return is calculated as the 
difference between the observed portfolio return    and predicted portfolio return using 
the CAPM model given the portfolio’s volatility and market risk premium: 
     [           ] (4) 
where   is the portfolio beta, and    is the risk-free rate
1
. 
2. Risk-Adjusted Return & Risk 
In addition to the evaluation of the mean return, we feel it is crucial to test and compare 
the risk-adjusted return in today’s financial environment as more and more investors 
begin to be aware of the risks in the stock markets, especially after the 2008 financial 
crisis.  We use Sharpe Ratio and Treynor Ratio to measure the risk-adjusted returns.  We 
further look at the risk factors such as portfolio standard deviation and beta.  We also test 
the maximum periodic loss as one of the risk factors. 
Procedure 
We use Sharpe Ratio as a reward-to-variability measure.  It is calculated as the portfolio 
risk premium per unit of deviation in an investment asset or trading strategy: 
                                                 
1
 Assumption of a constant zero risk-free rate is made for our purpose. 
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 (5) 
where risk factor   is the annualized standard deviation of the portfolio returns, which 
can be expressed as the following formula: 
     √  (6) 
 Likewise, we use Treynor Ratio as a reward-to-volatility measure.  It is calculated 
as the portfolio’s excess return over the risk-free rate to the additional risk taken: 
  
     
 
 (7) 
where risk factor   tests the sensitivity of change in portfolio’s value in relation to the 
change in market, which can be expressed as the following formula: 
  
          
       
 (8) 
3. Dividend Yields Effect 
Hypothesis 3 
To test whether adding the dividend-paying constraint in the Two-Minute Portfolio 
creates value for investors, in another word, whether there is a relation between dividend 
yields and portfolio returns, we perform a test of the null hypothesis that coefficients of 
dividend yields   are equal to zero at 95% significance level: 
              
 Moreover, since the Two-Minute Portfolio only asks for dividend-paying stocks, 
not the high dividend yields stocks, we compare the Two-Minute Portfolio returns with or 
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without the dividend-paying constraint in order to find whether such constraint 
contributes to the portfolio outperformance. 
Procedure 
To test the relation between dividend yields and portfolio returns, we use the equation 
estimated by Fama and French (1988): 
                           (9) 
where   is the portfolio return,   is the intercept,   is the coefficient of dividend yields, 
and   is the error term.  Dividend yield      can be expressed as the following formula: 
                 (10) 
where      is the price at time  , and      is the dividend for the year preceding  . 
 
Data 
Carrick (2007) gives a complete instruction on how to build an improved Two-Minute 
Portfolio with the following steps: 
1. Go to Globeinvestor.com and hold the cursor over where it 
says “Market Action” on the menu bar near the top of the 
page. 
2. On the drop-down menu, click on “Market Indexes.” 
3. Using Option B (index members stock report), select one of 
the 10 major subgroups of the S&P/TSX composite index 
(consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, 
health care, industrials, information technology, materials, 
telecom services and utilities). 
4. Where it says “Report Type,” select “Price Report – Quotes.” 
13 
 
5. When you get your search results, click the “Financial” tab at 
the top of the page to get view showing market capitalization 
for each stock. 
6. Click on the “Market Cap” column heading to order the 
stocks in the index from highest market cap to lowest. 
7. If you want to use an improved version of the original two-
minute strategy that includes only dividend-paying stocks, 
click on the stock symbols of the largest stocks by market cap 
to see if they pay a dividend. (p. B16) 
Based on the above steps and priorities, we construct our back-dated Two-Minute 
Portfolio with the following steps: 
1. Equal-Weight Constraint: Depending on the number the market sectors, 
choose two stocks in each sector, and divide investment into equal dollar 
amount for each stock.  The market sector is based on the ICB industry 
classification benchmark, which groups 10 sectors in an index. 
2. Market-Cap Constraint: Sort each sector’s stocks based on their market-cap 
from the largest to the smallest.  Choose stocks from the ones with the largest 
market-cap.  In most cases, the selected stocks are the blue-chip companies. 
3. Dividend-Paying Constraint: In each sector, choose two largest market-cap 
companies that pay dividends.  If dividend-paying constraint cannot be 
satisfied, choose the largest two market-cap stocks, just like the original Two-
Minute Portfolio.   
4. Annual-Rebalancing Constraint: At the beginning of each year, repeat step 1, 
2, and 3 to generate the new portfolio composition for the year.  Calculate the 
weight of holding stocks and compare the composition to the new portfolio.  
Buy and sell stocks to bring the portfolio to match the new composition and 
equal weight. 
14 
 
We first construct the Two-Minute Portfolio on TSX index as the strategy is first 
introduced to be working on the Canadian stock market.  We track the quarterly returns 
over time periods from 2002 to 2012 since it is the most data we can achieve.  We notice 
that our time period is different than Carrick’s which is back-dated to December 31, 1985 
by CPMS, an equity research and portfolio analysis firm owned by Mornigstar Canada.  
We are not able to access CPMS’s back-dated Two-Minute Portfolio composition, nor we 
are able to confirm whether CPMS follows the old or new strategy, or the combined old 
and new strategy.  We think the time period we track using the improved strategy can be 
a reasonable comparison to Carrick’s claims.   
Carrick (2010) also claims that a back-testing Two-Minute Portfolio on the U.S. 
stock market S&P 500 conducted by CPMS does not give good performance – a 16-year 
average annual return of only 3.6% in Canadian dollar terms.  To confirm that, we 
construct the Two-Minute Portfolio on S&P 500 as well based on the stated four steps.  
We are able to track the quarterly returns over time periods from 1991 to 2012.  In order 
to reflect different investment timing, we separate our time periods into two subsequent 
for analysis: 
 December 31, 1990 to December 31, 2012 (Greater Set: 22 years) 
o Herein referred to as 1991 to 2012 
 December 31, 1990 to December 31, 2001 (Subset: 11 years) 
o Herein referred to as 1991 to 2001 
 December 31, 2001 to December 31, 2012 (Subset: 11 years) 
o Herein referred to as 2002 to 2012 
15 
 
During the construction of the Two-Minute Portfolios under TSX and S&P 500, 
several issues come to our notice. 
First of all, the dividend-paying constraint sometimes cannot be satisfied.  For 
example, during the early years of TSX time period we track, some sectors such as 
Technology consist with only growth companies and they do not pay dividends.  We 
instead choose the stocks by market-cap only. 
For both Canadian and U.S. market, some holding companies in the portfolios 
change their ticker names.  We made the changes respectively. 
Moreover, for both markets, occasionally a holding company is acquired during 
the year and left only one stock in that sector.  We then allocate the proceeds to the next 
best fit company in that sector based on our portfolio selection process. 
A sample Two-Minute Portfolios of TSX and S&P 500 of year 2012 that we 
constructed is listed in Exhibit 1. 
We have obtained the stock prices and sector classification information, and 
constructed the Two-Minute Portfolios using the Bloomberg Professional service.  
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Exhibit 1: Sample Two-Minute Portfolios in 2012 
Sector TMP on TSX TMP on S&P 500 
Utility FTS D 
  CU SO 
Materials G FCX 
  ABX DD 
Consumer Goods SAP KO 
  MG PG 
Consumer Service L MCD 
  TRI WMT 
Financials TD JPM 
  RY WFC 
Health Care CLC PFE 
  VRX JNJ 
Industrial CP UPS 
  CNR GE 
Energy CNQ CVX 
  SU XOM 
Technology GIB MSFT 
  BB IBM 
Telecommunication RCI VZ 
  BCE T 
 
 
Empirical Results 
Our main test result of Two-Minute Portfolios can be concluded as Exhibit 2.  In our test, 
we conduct all t-test at significant level of 0.05.  Overall, as shown in Exhibit 3, 
portfolios applying the Two-Minute Portfolio strategy have 115.38% long-term return 
over 2002-2012 in Canadian market, and 415.29% long-term return over 1991-2012 in 
U.S. market.  Specifically for S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolio, it has a 538.36% long-
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term return starting for period 1991-2001, whereas a -8.21% long-term return starting for 
2002-2012. 
1. Mean Return 
Hypothesis 1 
As shown in Exhibit 2, the expected excess returns of the Two-Minute Portfolios are 
close to 0 for both TSX and S&P 500 indices over the whole testing period.  The 
respective p-values show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that excess returns are 0 for 
all testing periods.  However, interestingly, the excess returns of sub-periods test on S&P 
500 are noticeable.  For period 1991-2001, the Two-Minute Portfolio has a positive mean 
excess return of 1.08% over the benchmark, whereas for period 2002-2012, the Two-
Minute Portfolio has a negative excess return of -1.59%, which roughly offset the excess 
return gained during the first period.  Moreover, the p-value of the 2002-2012 period 
excess return t-test is 0.0657, which is very close to 0.05.  In another word, the t-test 
would fail if we take confidence level at 90%. 
Hypothesis 2 
As the t-test result shows in Exhibit 2 (row 5) , only the Two-Minute Portfolio on S&P 
500 index over period 1991-2001 has a statistically significant alpha of 2.14% with its p-
value of 0.0012 smaller than 0.05.  In other portfolios, there is no significant Jensen’s 
alpha. 
2. Risk-Adjusted Return & Risk 
As we take risk-free rate as 0, we both calculate the Sharpe Ratio and Treynor Ratio of 
the Two-Minute Portfolios and benchmarks.  Over all the testing periods, the Sharpe 
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Ratio of the Canadian benchmark is 0.2594, smaller than the TSX Two-Minute Portfolio 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.2676.  The Sharpe Ratio of the U.S. benchmark is 0.3108, smaller than 
the S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolio Sharpe Ratio of 0.322.  However, for sub-period 
2002-2012, the S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolio has a smaller Sharpe Ratio of 0.007 than 
its benchmark’s Sharpe Ratio of 0.1594. 
The Two-Minute Portfolios have better Treynor Ratios than those of the 
benchmarks through all periods in both markets.  However, for sub-period 2002-2012, 
the portfolio has a smaller Treynor ratio (0.034) than that of the benchmark (0.0139). 
Though all periods in both markets, the adjusted standard deviations of the Two-
Minute Portfolios’ quarterly returns are smaller than those of the benchmarks’ quarterly 
returns.  More importantly, for both periods of the S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolios, the 
volatilities of the portfolio returns (0.108 and 0.1312 in each sub-period) are smaller than 
the benchmark volatilities (0.145 and 0.1768 respectively). 
Noticeably, the beta of the portfolio is always below 1.  However, in sub-period 
2002-2012, the beta of the S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolio is not statistically significant, 
with its coefficient t-stats 1.1781 is smaller than 2. 
In order to understand how the strategy works during financial crisis, we check 
the worst quarterly loss in 2008.  Compare to the benchmarks’ maximum quarterly loss in 
2008, -21.07% in S&P 500 index and -22.48% in TSX index,  the Two-Minute Portfolio 
strategy gives the maximum quarterly loss of -18.73% and -17.31% respectively. 
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3. Dividend Yields Effect 
Hypothesis 3 
As shown in Exhibit 2 (row 21), we find that there is no significant relation between the 
Two-Minute Portfolio returns and dividend yields.  The p-values of the regression 
coefficient are not small enough in general.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient is not significant. 
We further look at the portfolio performance with and without the dividend-
paying constraint.  As shown in Exhibit 2, the excess returns of the portfolios are still not 
significant.  We then have to compare other statistics to value the strategies. 
For the Canadian market, the Two-Minute Portfolio with a dividend-paying 
constraint has a better long-term return of 115.38% compared to 108.21% without it.  
Same for the risk-adjusted return, the Two-Minute Portfolio with the dividend-paying 
constraint yields a higher Sharpe Ratio.   
However, for the U.S. Market, the Two-Minute Portfolio without dividend-paying 
constraint has a higher long-term return of 439.32% compared to 415.29% with it.  Same 
for the risk-adjusted return, the Two-Minute Portfolio without the dividend-paying 
constraint yields a higher Sharpe Ratio. 
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Exhibit 2: Statistics of Two-Minute Portfolios (TMP) in both Markets & without Dividend-Paying Constraint 
  TMP on TSX No Div. Constraint TMP on S&P 500 No Div. Constraint  Sub-period 1 Sub-period 2 
Period 2002-2012 1991-2012 1991-2001 2002-2012 
Rp 2.06% 2.00% 2.09% 2.15% 4.47% 0.05% 
Rm 2.06% 2.06% 2.48% 2.48% 3.63% 1.39% 
Excess Return 0.03% -0.03% -0.42% -0.37% 1.08% -1.60% 
p-value 0.987 0.986 0.707 0.745 0.504 0.066 
Alpha (Jensen) 0.26% 0.16% 0.54% 0.58% 2.13% -0.15% 
p-value 0.544 0.766 0.255 0.225 0.001 0.890 
Long-term Return Portfolio 115.38% 108.21% 415.29% 439.32% 538.36% -8.21% 
Long-term Return Benchmark 111.99% 111.99% 567.00% 567.00% 330.57% 54.94% 
Mean Annualised Cumulative Return 1.85% 1.77% 1.96% 2.01% 4.36% -0.12% 
σp 15.76% 16.10% 13.06% 13.19% 10.80% 13.12% 
σm 16.36% 16.36% 16.16% 16.24% 14.50% 17.68% 
β 0.875 0.896 0.620 0.625 0.645 0.133 
t-stats 15.133 14.297 11.213 11.208 8.447 1.178 
Max. Quarterly Loss Portfolio -15.87% -15.87% -18.73% -18.73% -9.58% -18.73% 
Max. Quarterly Loss Benchmark -22.48% -15.87% -21.07% -18.73% -14.64% -21.07% 
Sharpe Ratio Portfolio 0.268 0.252 0.322 0.328 0.766 0.007 
Sharpe Ratio Benchmark 0.255 0.255 0.311 0.311 0.506 0.159 
Treynor Ratio Portfolio 0.024 0.022 0.034 0.034 0.069 0.003 
Treynor ratio Benchmark 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.036 0.014 
Div. Yield – Return Coefficient  -0.509 -0.509 -0.955 -0.955 8.536 -1.193 
p-value 0.903 0.903 0.419 0.419 0.021 0.420 
N 44 44 88 88 44 44 
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Exhibit 3: TMP Long-term Portfolio Value in both Canadian and U.S. market 
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Discussion 
1. Mean Return 
Excess Return 
Based on the opposite empirical results for the S&P 500 Two-Minute Portfolios excess 
returns during both sub-periods (1.08% and -1.58%), it is essential to test whether both 
excess returns belong to the same distribution, or it is the positive and negative excess 
returns in the sub-periods cause the zero excess return over the greater period. 
In order to check the significance of the excess returns in the two sub-periods, we 
further apply t-test.  Our hypothesis here assumes that excess returns during the two sub-
periods have the same mean and variance.  As the test result shows in Exhibit 4, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis.  The two sets of excess returns can still be regarded as from 
the same distribution, with mean equals to 0. 
Exhibit 4: t-test on the TMP Excess Returns in two S&P 500 sub-periods 
h p-value t-stats df std 
0 0.1432 -1.47739 87 0.172 
 
Thus, we can conclude the Two-Minute Portfolio does not yield significant excess 
returns in the U.S. market. 
Furthermore, with the result that there is no significant excess return in the 
Canadian market as well, we conclude that the Two-Minute Portfolio may not give 
investors significant excess returns over benchmarks. 
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2. Risk-Adjusted Return & Risk 
Risk-Adjusted Return 
From our empirical result, we can find that Sharpe Ratios of the Two-Minute Portfolios 
for both markets generally are higher than those of the benchmarks, except that S&P 500 
Two-Minute Portfolio in sub-period 2002-2012 has a lower Sharpe Ratio. 
 We can find the same results for the Treynor Ratio. 
Therefore, we can say that the Two-Minute Portfolio may outperform the 
benchmark on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Beta 
From our test, we find the Two-Minute Portfolios in both markets and in all time periods 
have beta less than 1.  We also suggest there may be momentum effect across sub-periods 
that causes the insignificance of the simple CAPM beta in sub-period 2002-2012. 
However, we believe it is less important and can still conclude that the Two-
Minute Portfolio strategy result in lower beta, meaning the portfolio has less exposure to 
the systematic risk. 
Volatility and Mean-Variance  
As we can observe from the Exhibit 2, the adjusted standard deviations of the Two-
Minute Portfolios in both markets are always smaller than those of the benchmarks.  
Because the excess return is statistically zero, the Two-Minute portfolio is expected to 
have the same return as benchmark.  However, portfolios with lower volatilities are more 
Mean-Variance efficient when expected returns are the same.  Such advantage in the 
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volatility may make the Two-Minute Portfolio more appealing to long-term Mean-
Variance investors. 
Maximum Quarterly Loss 
It is clear from the empirical results that during financial crisis, the Two-Minute 
Portfolios experience lower quarterly loss.  We believe that the equal-weight strategy 
helps to explain this outperformance.  For example, if an investor holds an S&P 500 
market portfolio in 2008, he would have 13.3% of his investment in the Financial Sector, 
which suffers a significant loss during the financial crisis.  However, if he holds a Two-
Minute Portfolio at that time, only 10% of his investment is exposed to the Financial 
Sector because of the equal-weight strategy.  Thus, the Two-Minute Portfolio is less 
volatile during the financial downturn. 
 Moreover, as Exhibit 5 shows, the Two-Minute Portfolio usually outperforms the 
market during the financial crisis, but underperforms the market in the first recovering 
year after financial crisis. 
Exhibit 5: TMP Excess Returns in Sub-Period 2 
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3. Dividend Yields Effect 
Dividend-Paying Constraint 
As our test results show, removing the dividend-paying Constraint can neither generate 
excess returns, nor cause underperformance over benchmarks.  In terms of the risk-
adjusted performance, adding the dividend-paying constraint leads to opposite 
performance in the two markets.  Therefore, we do not have enough evidence to support 
that the dividend-paying constraint adds value to the Two-Minute Portfolio. We then 
believe it is not efficient to incorporate dividend-paying constraint into Two-Minute 
portfolio. 
 
Limitation 
We use different testing time period (2001-2012) to test the Two-Minute Portfolio on the 
TSX index than Carrick’s testing period (1986-2012).  That is the longest time period we 
could get for TSX index from the Bloomberg Professional service.  The difference in the 
testing time period may affect our results.  However, we feel the 11 years data in the 
Canadian market has a reasonable comparison to Carrick’s claim as both are considered 
to be long term.  Moreover, we are able to implement the Two-Minute Portfolio to the 
U.S. market and obtain a longer testing period to test the strategy.  We can reasonably 
rely on that test result. 
We are not able to obtain Carrick’s portfolio composition for the back-testing 
periods.  We are not sure which of the exact strategies Morningstar uses for Carrick to 
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calculate the returns.  Moreover, we find our portfolio composition is different than 
Carrick’s in some years, which may cause different results.  We think the following two 
reasons may explain such difference. 
Firstly, the difference may be due to using different sector classification method.  
To be consistent, we use ICB industry classification benchmark for the ten sectors in both 
Canadian and U.S. market.  However, Carrick does not specify his method.  We 
sometimes find different holdings in the TSX Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, and 
Health Care sectors.  Based on different indices and classification methods, the Two-
Minute Portfolio strategy may generate different results. 
Secondly, Carrick does not provide a solution for some unexpected situations 
such as when a holdings stock is acquired during the year and we are forced to trade.  We 
use the assumption as a rational conservative investor would do to have a portfolio as 
close as to Carrick’s Two-Minute Portfolio strategy, but it may still cause our holdings to 
be different.  The extra transaction cost may also affect the total return. 
Moreover, similar to Carrick’s approach, we do not include the transaction costs 
when evaluating portfolio performance since transaction costs are very different across 
different investors.  Carrick suggest the average trading commission in Canada ranges 
from 9 to 29 dollars depending on different brokerage firms, portfolio sizes, and average 
number of trades.  Our result could be different as well if cost factor is considered. 
Furthermore, we have not fully tested all the anomalies that we have reviewed in 
the past literature.  For example, we have not tested the size effect affects the return, 
since the Two-Minute Portfolio prefers large-cap blue-chip companies.  We have not 
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tested whether adding more holdings in each sector or holding equal weight sector ETFs 
would result better performance.  In addition, we have not fully tested the momentum 
effect.  It could be interesting to test whether increasing the rebalance schedule from 
annually to quarterly or monthly, which essentially is increasing the frequency to catch 
the momentum effect, could improve the performance.  These can be our interest for 
further studies in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
Carrick’s Two-Minute Portfolio combines the equal-weight strategy and anomalies such 
as size, dividend yields, and momentum effects.  Although for the long-term cumulative 
return, the Two-Minute Portfolio may outperform the benchmark as Carrick claims, 
statistics shows that the strategy does not generate statistically significant excess returns. 
 On the other hand, the Two-Minute Portfolio does seem to be less volatile than 
the market portfolio.  It performs better during the market downturn but does not 
outperform when the market recovers.  Thus, the Two-Minute Portfolio may have better 
performance than the market on a risk-adjusted basis in periods of heightened market 
volatility. 
 Last but not least, statistics show that adding the dividend-paying constraint may 
not yield significant excess returns over benchmark, or better risk-adjusted returns.  Thus, 
we conclude such constraint does not add value to the portfolio
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